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Résumé:  
 
Cet article dresse un portrait de la situation des taux marginaux effectifs d’imposition 
(TMEI) sur le revenu de travail au Québec. Il vise à permettre une meilleure 
compréhension de l’impact des politiques gouvernementales sur le comportement 
des agents économiques. À l’aide d’un modèle de microsimulation comptable 
reproduisant les systèmes d’impôts et de transferts au Québec pour 2002, nous 
mesurons les TMEI qui résultent de l’interaction des mécanismes de perception et de 
redistribution. En outre, nous en évaluons la répartition au sein de la population. 
L’analyse de ces taux démontre, entre autres, que la politique familiale du 
gouvernement, dont l’aide est ciblée vers les familles à faible revenu, engendre des 
TMEI élevés attribuables à la réduction généralement rapide des transferts avec le 
revenu de travail. Ainsi, plus du quart des chefs de famille monoparentale ont un 
TMEI pouvant atteindre, et même excéder, 80 %. Quant aux familles biparentales, 
elles font majoritairement face à un TMEI qui approche 50%. Nous montrons 
l’importance de tenir compte de l’hétérogénéité, à la fois selon les types de familles 
et selon les niveaux de revenu, de manière à bien évaluer la variabilité des TMEI à 
travers la population. 
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Abstract : 
 
This article draws up a portrait of effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) on labour 
income in Quebec. It aims at allowing a better understanding of the impact of tax 
policy on the behavior of economic agents. Using an accounting microsimulation 
model that reproduces the system of taxes and transfers in 2002 Quebec, we 
measure the EMTRs that result from the interaction of the mechanisms of income 
taxation and redistribution. Moreover, we evaluate the distribution of EMTRs in the 
population. The analysis of EMTRs shows, inter alia, that family policy, whose 
assistance is targeted towards low-income families, generates high levels of EMTRs 
ascribable to the generally fast reduction of transfers as income increases. More than 
a quarter of heads of single-parent households face an EMTR which can reach, and 
even exceed, 80%. As for the two-parent families, they mostly face EMTRs of around 
50%. We show the importance of accounting for EMTR heterogeneity, both with 
respect of types of families and levels of incomes, as well as evaluating the variability 
of EMTRs in the population. 
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 1. Introduction 
Implementation of redistributive policies by the government generally gives rise to 
the familiar trade-off between efficiency and equity. We say of a tax system that it is efficient 
when it minimizes the distortions in the behaviour of economic agents for any level of tax 
revenues. The tax rates implied by a tax system - while necessary to finance wealth 
redistribution programs designed to increase equity - may indeed create non-negligible 
inefficiency costs by modifying the environment within which individuals make decisions. 
Furthermore, the social transfer system introduces tax rates (albeit implicit) to the extent that 
the level of the transfers falls with increases in individuals’ income. In this context, the 
design of efficient government policies, as well as the analysis of their impact, requires a 
thorough understanding of the interaction of tax and transfer systems. 
This provides the main justification for this article. Its main contribution is to present 
the results of a simulation model that reproduces the system of taxes and transfers in Quebec 
so as to better understand the impact of fiscal mechanisms and income support programs on 
incentives to earn labour income.  The simulation model indeed allows a detailed descriptive 
analysis of effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) on personal and household income as they 
result from tax collection and redistribution. These rates depend in a complex and nonlinear 
fashion on the characteristics of individuals and households as well as on the level and their 
type of income. We use our model to estimate these EMTRs and describe their distribution 
and composition within the population of Quebec. We characterize households for which the 
family structure and the income composition is such that financial incentives are very weak at 
the margin - in some cases even nil or negative. Within this exercise we pay particular 
attention to the situation of families with children since these are, a priori, most affected by 
the complexity of Quebec’s tax collection and income redistribution mechanisms. 
A recent publication by the OECD, which dealt extensively with the issue of EMTRs, 
underscores the importance of a thorough understanding of fiscal mechanisms, such as the 
one our examination of Quebec allows: 
The analysis of how benefits and taxes depend on work status and earnings 
levels does not, by itself, tell us how changes in tax-benefit policy will actually 
influence labour supply or how many individuals live in income poverty and 
why. It does, however, contribute to a thorough understanding of the 
mechanics of tax-benefit systems. This understanding of how different tax-
benefit instruments interact with each other, as well as with people’s 
particular labour market and household situations, is an essential pre-
requisite for identifying tax-benefit reform priorities [OCDE (2004)]. 
The originality of our work is that of drawing a rich and original portrait of the 
distribution of marginal rates throughout the population of Quebec. To the best of our 
knowledge, only a single Canadian study, that of Macnaughton et al. (1998), has allowed 
these effective rates and their distribution across the population to be estimated. This latter 
study does not cover, however, all of the transfer programs we modelled in Quebec, in 
particular social assistance. 
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the notion of EMTRs 
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 and discusses its implications for computing the marginal cost of public funds. It also 
presents a qualitative analysis of the impact of family policy, as it has recently been 
implemented in Canada and Quebec, on EMTRs. Section 3 is devoted to presenting the 
model and the data used. Section 4 discusses all the results. Here we look at various measures 
of the joint distribution of EMTRs and the incomes and characteristics of households. We 
also decompose the mean rates so as to better understand the impact of different measures of 
taxation and transfer payments. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Effective marginal tax rates 
2.1 Definition 
In a document published by the Commission parlementaire sur la réduction de l’impôt 
des particuliers1 in 1999, EMTRs2 are described as a phenomenon that arises out of two 
mechanisms, collecting personal income taxes while simultaneously maintaining a policy of 
income support. Transfer programs are established in order to provide additional income to 
some citizens. They can take the form of direct social transfers or of tax code provisions that 
reduce the tax burden (or yield a rebate). The progressive nature of our tax system, combined 
with the selectivity of transfer programs, means that an increase in household income results 
in a double jeapordy: transfers are cut at the same time as taxes rise. As a third element, we 
add payroll taxes3. 
Mathematically, an EMTR is defined as follows. Assume, to simplify, a one-adult 
household. Let his disposable income be defined with the identity: 
,YD YL YO T TR= + − +  
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with  and ),,( ZYOYLTT = ),,( ZYOYLTRTR = , and where Z is a vector of individual 
characteristics. 
Thus, we have: 
( , , ) ( , , )YD YL YO T YL YO Z TR YL YO Z= + − + .
                                                
 (2.2) 
 
1 The Commission parlementaire sur la réduction de l’impôt des particuliers is not alone in its interest in the 
issue of EMTRs. Indeed, it follows in the footsteps of several other commissions and studies that have examined 
this phenomenon, such as the White Paper on the Personal Tax and Transfer Systems (1984), the Commission 
sur la réforme de la sécurité du revenu (1996), and the Commission sur la fiscalité et le financement des services 
publics (1996). 
2 The Government of Quebec uses the term “implicit” rather than “effective.”  We, however, prefer to reserve 
the expression “implicit rate” for transfer programs and use “effective rate” to capture income taxes and 
transfers. Thus, we primarily refer to “effective rates” in this text. 
3 We assume in this analysis that payroll deductions paid by the employee are perceived as taxes, and not as a 
source of future income (e.g., QPP premiums) or as an insurance premium for guarding against a risk such as 
the future loss of employment (e.g. , Employment Insurance premiums). 
4 
 Differentiating with respect to YL (to simplify, we assume that T(.) and TR(.) are 
differentiable in YL) yields: 
( ) ( )1 . (2.3) dYD T TR
dYL YL YL
∂ ⋅ ∂ ⋅⎡ ⎤= − −⎢ ⎥∂ ∂⎣ ⎦
Using equation (2.3), we define the EMTR on labour income as follows: 
( ) ( )1 dYD T TREMTR
dYL YL YL
∂ ⋅ ∂ ⋅= − = −∂ ∂ .   (2.4) 
The r.h.s. of Equation (2.4) reveals that the EMTR is the product of increases in 
income and sales taxes combined with decreases in transfers (when applicable) resulting from 
a marginal rise in income YL. The EMTR thus includes an explicit and an “implicit” 
component. The latter (also called the clawback rate) is defined as the proportion of the 
amount of transfers forfeited subsequent to a marginal increase in labour income. 
2.2 Distortions and the marginal cost of public funds 
The EMTRs under investigation create a gap at the margin between the social and 
private profitability of individuals’ behaviour on the labour market. Thus, they are at the root 
of distortions in many decisions, such as labour market participation, the number of hours 
worked, the level of work effort, investments in human capital (education, professional 
training, etc.), the geographical mobility of labour, occupational choices, and black-market 
labour.  
The presence of EMTRs also modifies the calculation of the marginal cost of public 
funds (MCPF), i.e., the cost to society of a one-dollar increase in tax revenues destined to 
fund public expenditures. In principle, this supplementary cost must be incorporated into any 
cost-benefit analysis of government programs.  Browning (1976) observes that the social cost 
of financing a marginal dollar of public expenditures is the sum of that dollar, which can no 
longer be used for private purposes, plus the change in total costs and social welfare caused 
by the distortions in individual choices created by the increased EMTR imposed when 
collecting that dollar. This sum is the MCPF, which thus incorporates the direct tax burden as 
well as the supplementary bonus. It has been demonstrated (e.g,. Fortin and Lacroix, 1994) 
that, in a linear economy of identical individuals in which the individual’s only choice is 
between leisure and consuming a private good, in which taxes are collected from a 
proportional tax on income (at a rate τ), and in which the public good is separable in the 
individual’s utility function, we have: 
1 ,
1
1
CMFP τ ητ
=
− −
  (2.5) 
where η is the uncompensated elasticity of labour supply with respect to the net wage 
rate. Equation (2.5) reveals that the MCPF is increasing in the EMTR, at least to the extent 
that the uncompensated labour supply elasticity is positive. Thus, when η = 0.3 and τ = 0, the 
MCPF is 1 dollar, while it is $1.43 when τ =0.5. In this latter case, there is an additional cost 
(= $0.43) at the margin for society to finance one dollar in additional public expenditure, 
owing to the greater marginal distortion in the hours of work. 
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 More generally, distortions in the number of hours of labour supplied, as measured by 
the MCPF, depend on a combination of three factors: the level of effective rates of taxation 
on labour income, the distribution of individuals (or households) across these rates, and the 
sensitivity of individuals’ labour supply behaviour.4 In this article, it is the distribution of the 
values of τ that are of particular interest to us. As we have seen, the MCPF increases with τ 
(assuming that η > 0), suggesting that the cost of financing public expenditures increases 
with their aggregate funding levels. However, it is not only the average level of τ confronting 
individuals that matters. It is, in fact, possible to demonstrate that the MCPF is convex in τ. 
Thus, for a given mean of τ, the greater its variability across individuals, the greater society’s 
MCPF. Consequently, in this article we will closely examine the mean as well as  the 
distribution across individuals of the EMTRs. 
2.3 The role of family policy 
Family policy, especially when it is targeted at low- and medium-income households, 
has a particularly pronounced incidence on the level and variability of the EMTR. This policy 
comprises a series of fiscal measures and transfer programs designed to support family 
incomes. In Quebec, it involves both levels of government, provincial and federal. Here we 
will simply provide a brief description of the main modifications to family policy having 
been implemented during the 15 years preceding 2002,5 along with their anticipated 
implications for the EMTR. 
In 1993, the federal government abolished two measures with universal coverage, the 
family allowance and the child tax credit,6 in order to focus financial assistance on low 
income families.7 These programs were replaced with the Canada Child Tax Benefit (CCTB), 
which includes a supplement to labour income for low-income families on top of a basic 
transfer. In addition, the federal government opted to grant a GST tax credit which, like the 
CCTB, is intended to provide a fiscal incentive to work. In 1997, the Government of Quebec 
also undertook a thorough reform of the assistance given to children. The design of the family 
allowance has thus been re-examined. In the past, it was simply a universal program whose 
generosity increased with the number of children. Since the reform, the family allowance has 
become a package of financial assistance measures targeted exclusively at low-income 
families. Moreover, the weight of children in social assistance schedules (now called 
employment assistance) has become an element of the family allowance. Finally, a universal 
daycare system at $5 per day was established.  
At the provincial level, a non-refundable tax credit is extended to taxpayers with 
                                                 
4 Dahlby (1998) derived an expression for the MCPF associated with a hike in the tax rate under a progressive 
tax system that accounts for the distribution of individuals and the different rates they face. Essentially, this is a 
matter of capturing changes to government revenue from each tax bracket subsequent to a change to the 
marginal rate of one of the brackets. This can be done with our model. 
5 A complete portrait of the history of the government’s participation in assistance to families is found in Rose 
(2001) and Vincent and Woolley (2001). 
6 The federal government continues to offer a non-refundable tax credit for the first child of a single-parent family. 
7 This support generally provides a level of assistance (in the form of a benefit, an allowance, a credit, etc.) that 
reaches its maximum for households whose family income varies between $20 000 and $30 000, approximately. 
As of a certain threshold located between two boundaries, the financial assistance paid out is gradually reduced 
until it reaches zero for medium- to high-income families. 
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 dependent children. A supplement is added to the base amount in the case of single-parent 
families as well as for parents whose children are enrolled in postsecondary education. 
Taxpayers with dependent children are also eligible for a tax cut with respect to the family.8 
Finally, the provincial government continues to provide financial assistance for daycare 
through the refundable tax credit for daycare expenses incurred by families unable to take 
advantage of the $5 per day service. The federal government, for its part, has opted for a tax 
deduction for daycare costs, deeming them to be expenses incurred for employment that 
reduce parents’ ability to pay income taxes.9  
Overall, both levels of government have chosen to focus on vertical redistribution. 
This approach seeks to increase the contribution of wealthier families to assisting poorer 
families (Baril et al., 1997). Universality in assistance to families has thus almost completely 
disappeared, and higher and more variable EMTRs upon exiting from income support 
programs are the flipside of the highly targeted policies for which the federal and provincial 
governments have opted in recent years.  
3. The model and the data used 
3.1 Structure and assumptions of the model 
The type of model we constructed to examine the distribution of EMTRs in Quebec 
simulates personal income taxes and governmental transfer programs for a sample of 
individuals, households, and families obtained from survey and administrative data (cf. Gupta 
and Kapur [2000] for a general presentation of these models). The model we use was initially 
created at the Ministère de l’emploi, de la solidarité sociale et de la famille du Québec 
(MESSF). We adapted it to our purposes. This is a static model that performs accounting 
calculations to reproduce taxes and transfers for the year 2002. On the basis of the 
information contained in the database, the simulations replicate the income declarations of 
each household in the sample and account for the various transfer programs to which it has 
access. A complete description of the measures applied by the governments of Quebec and 
Canada that are included in our model is provided in Appendix A. 
Several assumptions are necessary for performing a full simulation of tax and transfer 
programs. For example, no information regarding the amounts of daycare costs incurred by 
households with children is included in the database. Consequently, this had to be estimated. 
Thus, we let all families benefit from the $5 per day daycare service.10 In reality, for a 
number of reasons, not all parents benefit from this government program. Furthermore, we 
assume that only 50 per cent of the families eligible for the Parental Wage Assistance (PWA) 
program take advantage of it. It would not be realistic to include them all, since only families 
                                                 
8 This tax cut plays a different role than that of the non-refundable tax credit. The non-refundable tax credit is a 
fiscal measure that benefits all families, i.e., it is not income contingent. The credit corresponds to 20 per cent of 
an amount that varies with the number of children. The principle of universality no longer obtains in the case of 
the tax reduction for families, since this measure essentially benefits low income families: the allowable tax 
deduction is reduced by 3 per cent of the family income exceeding $26,700. 
9 Vincent and Woolley (2001) compare the two levels of government in terms of what is unique in each one’s 
approach to the tax treatment of daycare expenditures. 
10 It is also possible to run all simulations with regular daycare costs. The tax treatment in effect is then that 
which prevailed prior to the introduction of the $5 daycare service. 
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 that apply obtain this form of income support. According to the MESSF, approximately 47 
per cent of eligible families benefited from the program in 2002. A complete description of 
our various assumptions is included Appendix B. 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
In the literature, the descriptive analysis of EMTRs is based on two different 
approaches. Most authors resort to representative agents to compare effective taxation on 
different household categories. This method is widely used, in part because it is relatively 
easy to implement. The second approach consists of determining the distribution of EMTRs 
across the population. It allows a much more complete analysis, but also requires the use of a 
representative database of households. The model we use has the advantage of allowing 
results from both of these approaches to be generated. 
One example of a representative tax profile is shown in Figure 1 for a two-parent 
family with one income, two children aged 3 and 5, and participating in the PWA program 
for the tax year 2002. For the calculations we assume a single source of labour income as 
well as successive $10 wage increments. 
Figure 1 : Example of a tax profile (two-parent family) 
 
Source: Direction de l’analyse économique et des projets gouvernementaux, MESSF 
 
0
5 000
10 000
15 000
20 000
25 000
30 000
35 000
0 5 000 10 000 15 000 20 000 25 000 30 000
Total income ($)
D
is
p
os
ab
le
 i
n
co
m
e 
($
)
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
140%
160%
180%
200%
EM
TR
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the EMTR as a function of the family’s labour 
income and reveals the zones in which the rates are highest. Quebec’s finance ministry also 
has its own model of disposable income, yielding the implicit marginal rates that are 
published in Commission sur la réduction des impôts des particuliers (1999) and that underlie 
the results presented in Ouellet (1998). An analysis of representative tax profiles is also used 
by Bernier and Lévesque (1995) and Laferrière (2001), who address the programs of the 
federal and provincial governments, as well as by Davies (1998), who deals exclusively with 
federal taxes and transfers. Recently, a study by the OECD (2004) also evoked this technique. 
This study was unique in presenting the budget constraints of different household types for 
some twenty countries, OECD members and non-members.11 Three important elements 
                                                 
11 Canada was not included in this study. 
Revenu disponible Taux marginal d' imposit ionEMTRDisposable nc me
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 generally differentiate between studies having been conducted using representative agents: 
the number of different household types retained, the income intervals considered, and the set 
of fiscal measures and transfers incorporated into the study. An important finding emerges in 
most representative agent studies: it is those households that are net beneficiaries of 
government transfers that confront the highest EMTRs (Government of Quebec, 1999). More 
generally, it is those with low incomes that are most highly taxed (in effective terms) at the 
margin (Bernier and Lévesque, 1995; Ouellet, 1998; Davies, 1998; and Laferrière, 2001). 
This result is not surprising if we examine the structure of governmental transfer policies. In 
order to target assistance at the most needy households and curb the costs of government 
programs, transfer measures are indeed accompanied by very high clawback rates (i.e., the 
level of financial assistance declines very rapidly as family income rises), thus increasing the 
EMTR.  
Nonetheless, there are limitations to the conclusions that can be drawn from an 
analysis of representative agents. A demonstration that a family with very specific 
characteristics has an extremely high EMTR within a certain income bracket tells us nothing 
about how many families are in that position. Therefore, Davies (1998) pushes the analysis a 
little further, calculating the mean effective rate facing Canadians (51 per cent in 1994). 
However, this result is based on aggregate data, thus limiting the level of precision of his 
work.  
More detailed studies have been conducted to determine the distribution of EMTRs 
across the population and to describe the characteristics of individuals facing the highest 
rates. In 1998, a U.S. study by the Joint Committee on Taxation compared statutory rates 
(which only reflect the income taxation mechanism) and EMTRs for all households in the 
country. The study highlighted the fact that 25 per cent of U.S. taxpayers face an EMTR that 
differs from the official tax rate. In Canada, the corresponding value is 56 per cent12 for the 
same fiscal year (Macnaughton et al., 1998). Work by Macnaughton et al. (1998) also 
revealed that high EMTRs are mostly found amongst taxpayers in the 17 per cent bracket, i.e. 
those whose incomes are lowest. While only 2 per cent of individuals whose income is in the 
highest tax bracket are confronted with a different EMTR than that explicitly provided for by 
the Act, 89 per cent of those taxed at 17 per cent are in that situation. The authors further 
mention that, aside from income, family characteristics have an impact on the EMTR. Among 
other things, the effective EMTR increases by two or three percentage points per child - an 
effect that disappears in the case of families in the highest income brackets. The study by 
Laroque and Salanié (1999) on the tax and transfer system in France yields results that 
parallel those generated by Canadian and U.S. simulations. 
3.3 The data used 
The data we use are from Statistics Canada’s Social Policy Simulation Database and 
Model (SPSD/M). This model was designed to permit the analysis of fiscal policy, transfer 
programs, and sales taxes for all Canada or for individual provinces. We extract data from 
                                                 
12 This is probably a lower bound, since social assistance, which is at issue in the high values of EMTRs, is not 
included in the simulations of Macnaughton et al. (1998). 
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 this microsimulation model and perform calculations with our own model. We proceed in this 
way because the SPSD/M system is not flexible enough for our purposes and also because 
some Quebec policies, such as the PWA program, have not been incorporated into it. 
Nonetheless, we deem the SPSD/M database to best suited to our information needs. It was 
constructed by combining individual administrative data from personal tax returns and 
historical data on EI recipients with survey data on family incomes and expenditures.  
Five main sources of data allowed the Social Policy Simulation Database (SPSD) to 
be constructed. The first is the Consumer Finance Survey, which is the principal source of 
information available to Statistics Canada regarding the distribution of income across 
individuals and families. Essential information for the simulations we conducted is found in 
it. A second source of information comes from individual tax returns. These returns provide 
important information that is complementary to survey data, but is severely handicapped by 
the absence of detailed information on several aspects of taxation. A sample of historical EI 
claims represents the third source of microdata. The fourth is the Household Expenditure 
Survey that is periodically conducted by Statistic Canada. In addition to containing very 
detailed data on Canadians’ incomes and the structure of household expenditures, its main 
contribution is to supply information on net changes to households’ assets and liabilities. 
Data on savings proved particularly useful during the simulations, for example to determine a 
family’s eligibility for the PWA program (a means test is imposed to determine whether a 
low-income family qualifies for the transfer). The developers of the SPSD drew on one final 
source, the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics. This is a longitudinal survey of 
households that provides data on income and labour-market experience.13 The SPSD, 
containing much more information than a single survey, has all the variables required for the 
simulations we wish to run. 
The data we extracted from the SPSD were initially stored at the level of the 
individual. We aggregated individuals into a broader grouping, the census family, while 
retaining the information on each member (for example, labour income of the household head 
as well as of other family members). The SPSD defines a census family as “a head, their [sic] 
spouse (if there is one), and their children under the age of 25 (including their guardian 
children), living together in the same dwelling.” Thus, two single individuals living under the 
same roof constitute two census families. Consequently, in the context of our fiscal analysis, 
these two individuals are considered separately. We also treat an individual aged 18 and over, 
who is not studying and who earns a taxable income but still lives at home, as single. This 
processing of the initial database allows us to obtain a sample suitable for tax analysis. 
4. Analysis of the results 
Microeconometric studies having examined the impact of government policies on 
labour supply have generally concluded that the elasticity of labour supply with respect to the 
net wage rate is relatively low for the population as a whole. However, these elasticities can 
be greater for specific groups, such as the heads of single-parent families. As a consequence, 
                                                 
13 For more information regarding the micro databases and their creation, consult the SPSD/M document 
Database Creation Guide. 
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 it is vital to go beyond the mean impacts that tax and transfer mechanisms might have to 
analyse their incidence in the framework of specific family situations, in particular at various 
income levels. 
Our microsimulation model makes this possible by measuring EMTRs for a 
representative sample of the population. Using various tools, such as representative tax 
profiles and density graphs, we paint a picture of the situation of EMTRs in Quebec. We 
address the level, distribution, and composition of rates and describe the characteristics of 
households in the different effective tax brackets. Recall that, as we already mentioned in 
Section 2.2, the MCPF is convex with respect to the EMTR. Consequently, for a given mean 
EMTR, the MCPF increases with the variability of the EMTR, and it is thus important to 
account for this variability. 
4.1 Representative tax profiles 
As we underlined in Section 3.2, recourse to representative tax profiles is a relatively 
easy way to compare effective taxation between various household categories. Our 
presentation differs from that based on representative agents that we generally find in the 
literature because it is associated with a total EMTR that allows the contribution of each 
element of the tax and transfer system (income taxes, tax credits, tax rebates, programs to 
assist families, income supplements, employee payroll taxes such as QPP and EI) to be 
illustrated. Three tax profiles will be the subject of a brief presentation. For each one, the 
EMTRs (computed using $10 increments14) are presented for family incomes varying 
between 0 and $70 000.15 We opted for a $10 increase, at the margin, in order to illustrate 
more clearly the discontinuities associated with entry and exit thresholds for the various 
social programs. Furthermore, sensitivity analysis conducted on increments ranging from $10 
to $1000 reveals that the evolution of the marginal rate in the framework of an analysis of 
representative tax profiles changes little as a function of the retained income level. 
4.1.1 Single individuals 
The tax profile of a representative single person is illustrated in Figure 2. Its 
presentation is relatively straightforward, owing to the limited number of fiscal measures and 
programs affecting this type of household. We note that the EMTR is initially negative, i.e., 
the amount received in transfer payments rises following an increase in income. This is 
because social assistance (also called employment assistance in Quebec) is not affected by 
the first dollars earned, while the GST credit rises with income. When income exceeds a 
penalty exemption threshold ($1200 when the individual is not affected by employment 
constraints), the presence of social assistance, in conjunction with QPP and EI premiums, 
pushes the EMTR over 100 per cent. Only when income approaches $12 000 does the single 
individual experience a decline in the EMTR. In this situation the concept of a “poverty trap” 
                                                 
14 The increase in household income is attributable to a wage raise given to the individual who is considered the 
“household head” according to Statistics Canada’s classifications.  
15 When the family income exceeds $70 000, the effective marginal tax rate stabilizes at about 45 per cent 
(depending on the characteristics of the household). With a few exceptions, only fiscal measures on income 
taxes are imposed on the dollar earned at the margins, while transfer programs generally have no impact on 
higher income brackets. 
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 truly comes into its own, since we can graphically visualize the presence of a barrier that 
impedes any incentive to work on behalf of social assistance recipients. Let us also underline 
the presence of a discontinuity in the rate when income reaches a level that triggers EI 
premiums (this premium, at 2.20 per cent, applies to the first $2000 earned in excess of this 
employment income threshold). Finally, we observe that these calculations omit some special 
benefits accruing to certain social assistance recipients (e.g., the drug insurance plan, dental 
care, disaster relief, etc.) that are terminated when they are no longer in the program. In this 
case, the EMTR can easily exceed 100 per cent.  
Figure 2 : Representative tax profile for a single individual 
 
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 5 000 10 000 15 000 20 000 25 000 30 000 35 000 40 000 45 000 50 000 55 000 60 000 65 000 70 000
Family Income
EM
TR
QPP Employment insurance Federal tax
Provincial tax GST credit QST credit
Prop. tax refund Drug insurance premium Social ass.
Let us now observe the evolution of the EMTR after leaving social assistance. The 
conjunction of federal and provincial income taxes, premiums (QPP, EI, and the drug 
insurance plan), credits (GST and Quebec Sales Tax, QST), and property tax refunds causes 
the EMTR to vary between 35 and 58 per cent. Aside from the previously mentioned 
elements, an individual living alone receives an income tax credit. In the graphical 
representation reproduced above, this credit is included in the category “provincial income 
tax.” Above $26 700, the reduction in the credit results in an increase in 3.1 per cent in the 
marginal rate attributable to provincial income tax. When single individuals earn over $70 
000, their EMTRs stabilize at 45.7 per cent, then at 48.2 per cent at $103 000. 
4.1.2 The single-parent family 
Overall, the EMTR of the single-parent family is higher and more variable than that 
of the single individual, owing to its eligibility to a greater number of transfer programs. One 
example is the National Child Benefit Supplement offered by the Government of Canada, 
with a rate reduction of 32.1 per cent for families with three children. Figure 3 illustrates the 
tax profile of the single-parent family. 
As is the case for single individuals, we point out that the EMTR can be negative for 
very low income families. This situation is possible because of the PWA program.16 Figure 3 
                                                 
16 A basic income is necessary to qualify for the PWA program ($1200 annually). The amount required is less 
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 illustrates how the PWA program cuts the EMTR, as the hatched section represents the 
progression of the rates in its absence. Thus, we see that this government measure partially 
“breaches” the barrier formed by the reduced social assistance benefits following from a rise 
in income. Comparable results are obtained from the analysis of representative agents 
conducted by Bernier and Lévesque (1995), as well as from the Commission parlementaire 
sur la réduction de l’impôt des particuliers (1999). Conversely, once the single-parent family 
leaves social assistance, the PWA benefit, along with its supplement (which subsidizes fees 
for daycare services), are gradually reduced, triggering an increase in the EMTR that may 
reach 154.6 per cent17 at the $15 000 to $18 000 level. 
Note that the rate is relatively low between $23 000 and $25 000, an income level as 
of which transfers and credits begin to decline, bringing the EMTR to 80 per cent for the 
single-parent family (with an income between $28 000 and $36 000, approximately).  Notice 
that the category “provincial income tax” includes the income tax abatement for families. As 
it is cut (following the increase in income), the marginal rate attributable to provincial income 
taxes rises by 3 per cent. Also note the presence of high clawback rates, especially for family 
allowances (35 per cent between $15 340 and $21 200), the CCTB (22.5 per cent between 
$25 150 and $35 700), and the PWA program with its supplement (43 per cent between $15 
340 and $18 460). As of $70 000, the EMTR of single-parent families stabilizes at 
approximately 50 per cent. 
Figure 3 : Representative tax profile for a single-parent family  
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4.1.3 The two-parent family 
Figure 4 illustrates the representative tax profile for a family consisting of two 
children and two adults with a single source of employment income. Note the absence of 
                                                                                                                                                        
than the threshold below which social assistance benefits begin to decline for the single-parent family ($2400). 
Consequently, an income supplement is dispensed without the social assistance transfer being affected, which 
explains why the rate moves below zero before rising. 
17 This rate is reached when we consider the rise in childcare fees confronting the heads of single-parent families 
when their presence on the labour market increases. 
13 
 daycare costs and the PWA program supplement, since we assume that one of the two parents 
remains at home. As we pointed out in the case of the single-parent family, the hatched area 
represents the rates that would obtain in the absence of the PWA program. We observe that 
the taxation rate attributable to this program becomes positive (i.e., the amount of the benefit 
decreases) while social assistance is still received, bringing the marginal rate to over 100 per 
cent between $12 500 and $16 000 (this situation was also observed in the case of the single-
parent family). Thus, the PWA program, which is supposed to provide an incentive to 
participating in the labour market, only partially achieves this goal. We note that the 
clawback rate (up to 43 per cent) contributes to maintaining the EMTR at over 60 per cent, 
even when the household ceases to be a net beneficiary of social assistance. Finally, we note 
that combining it with the Shelter Allowance program brings the total rate to more than 80 
per cent for a family whose income is approximately $20 000. 
Figure 4 : Representative tax profile for a two-parent family  
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Despite the fact that tax profiles provide a relevant illustration of the evolution of the 
EMTR, it must be borne in mind that they are only valid for the specific cases that were 
simulated. Since households are heterogeneous, a representative tax profile cannot be 
generalized to represent effective taxation of an entire population. Only application of the 
system of income taxes and transfers to a representative sample of a population can allow the 
distribution of the EMTR across that population to be examined. 
4.2 Simulation from a sample 
Table 1 presents the distribution of the four household types studied after the sample 
has been weighted. According to our sample, 2.9 million households are childless and slightly 
over 850 000 have children. 
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 Table 1: Distribution of households by family status 
    
Number of 
households 
Proportion of 
total population
Childless households 2 899 201 77% 
  Single 1 830 259 49%
  Childless couple 1 068 942 28%
Households with children(s) 854 594 23% 
  Single parent 148 719 4%
  
Two-parent 
family 
705 875 19%
       
All 
households  3 753 795 100% 
        
Figure 5 : Distribution of households by family income 
 
It is of some use to briefly examine the distribution of households by family income. 
Figure 5 illustrates this distribution for each of the four groups. The proportion of low-
income households is higher among single individuals (61.2 per cent earning between $0 and 
$20 000) and single-parent families (51.1 per cent earning between $0 and $20 000) than 
among households with two adults. The group of two-parent families contains the highest 
proportion of households whose incomes exceed $40 000, 73.3 per cent (54.7 per cent for 
childless couples, 24.4 per cent for single-parent families, and 15.3 per cent for singles). 
Figure 5 also shows mean incomes, by parent and for the entire household - again, by family 
status. In Quebec’s fiscal system, income taxes are assessed on an individual basis that 
partially accounts for the income of the family to which the person belongs. Since we shall 
pay particular attention to examining EMTRs for families, we note that a gap of a little more 
than $25 000 separates the mean income of the head of a two-parent family from that of a 
single-parent family. This gap will have a significant impact on the distribution of the 
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 EMTRs facing these families. 
4.2.1 The distribution of the EMTRs 
Using our model, we measure EMTRs for $1000 increments in household incomes.18 
Various density measures were invoked to examine their distribution throughout the 
population. These allow us, for example, to determine the percentage of the population facing 
an EMTR that exceeds 60 per cent, or to characterize households for whom we find the 
highest effective rates. To do this we used nonparametric kernel estimation techniques 
(Fournier, 2005). 
4.2.1.1 Marginal rates for the entire population: three peaks 
Figure 6 presents the distribution of the population according to the values that the 
EMTR can assume. Three peaks characterize this distribution: zero EMTR, the 35 to 50 per 
cent tax bracket, and effective taxation at 100 per cent. With regards to the first peak, we first 
observe that 11 per cent of households benefit from a negative EMTR, i.e., marginal increase 
in their income will yield an additional net transfer. If we include, in this first group, all 
households for whom the effective rate of taxation is below 20 per cent, then one household 
in five benefits from a negative or relatively low rate. 
Figure 6 : Density of the EMTR for the entire population 
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For nearly half of households (46 per cent), the EMTR falls between 35 and 50 per 
cent. For this second peak, in the centre of the graph, we distinguish between two sub-peaks, 
at 39 and 45 per cent. These two effective rates essentially correspond to the marginal rate of 
                                                 
18 The representative tax profiles we presented previously were based on a $10 increase, at the margin, in order 
to illustrate more clearly the cuts associated with entry and exit thresholds for the various social programs. In 
order to analyse EMTRs across the population, we opted for a greater increase that probably better captures the 
situation of an individual receiving a wage raise. Furthermore, the $1000 raise is commonly used in the 
literature, especially by the Commission parlementaire sur la réduction de l’impôt des particuliers (1999) and by 
Laferrière (2001), making it easier to compare results. As for the representative tax profiles, the increase in 
household income is attributable to a wage raise given to the individual who is considered the “household head” 
according to Statistics Canada’s classifications. 
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 income taxation of the two levels of government: 20 and 24 per cent provincially, and 22 and 
26 per cent federally.19 Households finding themselves in this situation are mainly those 
whose family income exceeds $40 000 and who are, at the margin, relatively unaffected by 
government programs.  
Finally, for 8 per cent of households, the EMTR is greater than 80 per cent. Indeed, 
for most of them it reaches 100 per cent, corresponding to the loss of one dollar of transfers 
for each additional dollar earned. With a mean family income of $6779,20 it is essentially 
households receiving social assistance that we find in this category (households whose 
benefits are amputated by one dollar for each additional dollar in labour income). Households 
whose EMTR is nil also benefit from financial support from social assistance. However, the 
family income of these latter is so low that, when we increase it by $1000 in our simulations, 
it remains below the threshold for exemption from penalties under social assistance (meaning 
that an additional dollar of income will not result in an equivalent reduction in the transfer). 
Within the group of households whose marginal tax rate is 100 per cent, we find 5 per cent of 
single-parent families, compared with 1 per cent of two-parent families. Also, 10 per cent of 
single individuals are in this situation. The following figures and tables allow us to better 
grasp the characteristics of the households that cluster around the three main taxation peaks. 
In order to extend our analysis and elaborate on the results mentioned above, a second 
graph allows us to study the distribution of the population as a function of two variables, the 
EMTR and family income. This graph is yielded by the estimation of a bivariate density. 
Observe Figure 7, in which we again find the three peaks that characterize the distribution of 
the population as a function of the tax rate. This new figure adds some information to our 
analysis. We see that households confronting rates that are either nil or 100 per cent are 
clearly concentrated in the lowest income brackets (i.e. between $0 and $20 000). In addition, 
rotating the graph (see the lower pane in Figure 7) reveals the presence of a single peak for 
medium- and high-income households.  To verify this, we estimated the density of the EMTR 
conditional on income. This measure can be seen as a cross-section of the graph of the 
bivariate density at a given level of income. These results are presented in Figure 8. In the 
case of households whose family income is $10 000, we identify three zones of concentration 
at 0, 40, and 100 per cent, while those whose family income is $80 000 are all clustered 
around a single peak.  
                                                 
19 At the provincial level, the marginal rate of taxation on incomes between $26 701 and $53 405 is 20 per cent, 
rising to then 24 per cent above $53 405. Federally, it is 22 per cent between $31 678 and $63 345, and then 26 
per cent above $63 345. For the sum of the rates of the two levels of government to be 39 and 45 per cent, it is 
necessary to account for the Quebec tax abatement that reduces federal taxation. 
20 This mean family income was measured for households whose marginal rate is between 95 and 105 per cent. 
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 Figure 7 : Joint density of EMTRs and incomes for the entire population 
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 Figure 8 : Density of EMTRs conditional on income being $10 000 and $80 000 
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4.2.1.2 Marginal rates by family status: the impact of the income distribution 
The four graphs presented in Figure 9 take our analysis yet further. They present the 
distribution of households as a function of EMTRs and income, by family status.  
Although we do observe some occurrences amongst single-parent families, the 
majority of households facing a 100 per cent EMTR are those with no children (single 
individuals and childless couples). This is an interesting point, and merits that we pay some 
attention to the underlying explanations. At first blush, it appears plausible that the PWA 
program is a factor since, as we stated when presenting the representative agents, it 
contributes to lowering the marginal rate in the zone in which households are the 
beneficiaries of social assistance. After further investigation, however, it seems that the PWA 
program is not the reason for this result. In fact, we tested the sensitivity of our results for 
families by varying participation in the PWA program, from complete non-participation to 
full participation. Our results showed little sensitivity to these changes. While the PWA 
program has a significant impact on reducing the EMTR for some household types, as we 
saw before and as discussed in the literature by Bernier and Lévesque (1995), its impact 
remains minor in terms of the distribution of EMTRs amongst all families. Rather, the fact 
that households that are taxed at 100 per cent at the margin tend not to be families is 
explained as follows. Those for which we have a 100 per cent EMTR are largely those whose 
income is greater than $0 and less than $10 000 (households with one adult) or $15 000 
(households with two adults). This applies to 26 per cent21 of single individuals, explaining 
their prevalence in the 100 per cent EMTR group. 
                                                 
21 The proportion of single individuals whose income is greater than $0 and less than $10 000. 
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 Figure 9 : Joint density of EMTRs and incomes, by status 
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Amongst single-parent families, 15 per cent are in this situation, while 24 per cent 
have a family income that is nil. For these latter, the maximum income allowed by social 
assistance is not reached when a $1000 rise in income is simulated. Consequently, their 
marginal rate is nil, or even negative, when the family qualifies for the PWA program but 
does not surpass a threshold beyond which it is penalized. Also, for single-parent families 
that are penalized (by the loss of some of the social assistance benefit), the PWA program 
effectively lowers the marginal rate to approximately 80 per cent.22 As to two-income 
                                                 
22 It is important to recall that we assumed that only 50 per cent of families participate in the PWA program. 
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 households, fewer of them have an income below $20 000 (9 per cent), which explains the 
low percentage among them with a marginal rate of 100 per cent. In summary, it is primarily 
the distribution of incomes unique to each group that explains why households with children 
are not typically taxed at a marginal rate of 100 per cent. Moreover, we should not forget that 
a hike in income of $5000 would leave over 80 per cent of families in a situation in which 
their effective tax rate, for a $1000 raise, would be nil. 
We have mentioned that a significant proportion of single-parent families benefit 
from an EMTR equal to zero. We also find a significant concentration amongst single 
individuals. Once again, these households are generally those with zero family income. The 
greatest proportion is in households with a family income equal to zero among singles (10 per 
cent) and single-parent families (24 per cent). We also note that low income taxes are levied 
on youths aged 18 and plus who are not enrolled in post-secondary studies and live with their 
parents. With a mean EMTR of 25 per cent, these youths contribute to raising the proportion 
of single individuals faced with low EMTRs.  
For the four household types, we observe significant clustering in the central zone of 
the graphs. However, close examination reveals that this clustering occurs around a different 
rate for each of the four groups. For single individuals and childless couples, the centre is at 
an EMTR of 40 per cent. For families, the greatest concentrations are at higher rates, 50 per 
cent for two-parent families and nearly 60 per cent for single-parent families. This result 
reflects the presence of many transfer programs that directly affect the family. We will 
discuss this in greater detail when we analyse the different components of the EMTR. When 
we examine the graph of the density of the marginal rates for the entire population, the zones 
of highest concentration are located around 39 and 45 per cent, i.e., below the levels that 
characterize families. This is because single individuals and childless couples represent 75 
per cent of the weighted sample. 
In conclusion, we point out that the distribution of rates is particularly smooth in the 
case of two-parent families. Since 73 per cent of them have a family income that exceeds $40 
000, they are, for the most part, taxed at a rate of approximately 50 per cent at the margin. 
This rate is broken down into two components: income taxes levied by the two levels of 
government (45 per cent) and the CCTB (5 per cent). This reveals that, at the margin, the 
burden on two-parent families is already quite high. For the most part, their situation is such 
that only one half of income earned at the margin is available to them. Consequently, a 
reform of the tax and transfer systems that would increase the effective tax burden on 
medium- and high-income households would raise the EMTR, which is already high, on two-
parent families. 
4.2.2 The expected marginal rate as a function of income: an overview for each 
group 
At this point, we are principally interested in the expected marginal rate as a function 
of family income. This allows a more targeted assessment of the impact a wage raise may 
have given a specific financial starting position. While the density measures we have already 
                                                                                                                                                        
Thus, some families receiving social assistance may be taxed at a 100 per cent rate.  
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 looked at shed light on the distribution of rates, estimating expected marginal rates reveals 
the expected level that the EMTR can attain for a given income level.  
The first conclusion that arises when we observe the expected marginal rate for each 
of the four household groups is that, for some income brackets, families (whether headed by 
one or two parents) may be confronted with a marginal rate that exceeds the 50 per cent bar. 
This is not the case for singles and childless couples, as we see in Table 2. 
Table 2: Expected marginal rate as a function of income, by family status 
 0 $ 
- 
10 000 $
10 000 $
-
20 000 $
20 000 $
-
30 000 $
30 000 $
-
40 000 $
40 000 $
-
50 000 $
50 000 $ 
- 
60 000 $ 
60 000 $
-
70 000 $
70 000 $
-
100 000 $
Single 27.3 34.8 41.0 46.0 40.3 40.5 43.1 45.3
Single parent 14.9 49.7 57.3 59.6 53.4 49.1 49.4 48.9
Childless couples 41.8 36.0 36.6 42.1 40.0 39.3 40.2 41.3
Two-parent family 17.0 36.7 51.4 53.4 47.6 46.4 47.7 45.4
Total population 28.6 35.9 41.5 46.6 42.5 42.1 43.9 43.5
 
Overall, families face the highest average tax rates. Conversely, when household 
income is below $10 000, the expected rate on families is lower than that on childless 
households. It is within the group of single-parent families that the highest expected EMTR is 
observed. Between $15 000 and $45 000, the expected rate for this group remains above the 
50 per cent threshold, reaching 62 per cent at $35 000 (cf. Figure 10).  
As a rule of thumb, the expected rate varies significantly with the family status when 
income is below $50 000, while it converges to 45 per cent for all higher-income households. 
Figure 10 : Expected marginal rate as a function of income, by family status 
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 4.2.3 The decomposition of the marginal rates and the impact of governmental 
assistance programs 
In this section we present the decomposition of the expected EMTR for each of the 
four household types that we are interested in. This new phase of our analysis will yield the 
weight of each program and tax measure in the composition of the total rate. 
The same EMTR for two different households does not necessarily imply an identical 
fiscal situation. For example, in Table 3 we see a single individual and a single-parent family 
both facing the same expected EMTR, 35 per cent. For the single individual, income taxation 
represents nearly 60 per cent of the mean marginal rate, while this share is 50 per cent for the 
single-parent family. Though the share of the marginal dollar earned that must be remitted in 
taxes is smaller than for the single person, the single-parent family loses out on transfer 
payments it had been receiving. In fact, on an additional $1 in labour income, it will pay 
$0.17 in income taxes on average ($0.21 for a single individual), $0.03 in various premiums 
($0.04 for singles) and forfeit $0.13 in transfers ($0.11 for singles), yielding the same 
marginal rate for both groups. 
Table 3: Decomposition of the mean effective rate, by family status 
 
Two-parent 
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Compared to the household consisting of a single adult, the mean marginal rate on a 
childless couple and a two-parent family is higher by 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. Also 
observe that marginal income tax rates are higher for households headed by two adults. 
Furthermore, marginal income taxation distinguishes the single-parent family from the two-
parent family. The clawback rate on transfer programs is less for the latter. It is the greater 
wealth, on average, of families with two adults that explains the different composition of the 
mean marginal rate (recall from Figure 5 how the average income of the head of a single-
parent family is lower than that of a two-parent family). With a mean income level near $25 
000 (earned by the head of a single-parent family), the income tax rate for both levels of 
Fédéral tax 10,6 30% 8,7 25% 14,2 36% 15,6 35% 12,5 33% 
Provincial tax 10,3 29% 8,6 25% 15,0 38% 16,1 36% 12,6 33% 
3,9 Dues (1) 3,8 11% 3,4 10% 3,6 9% 9% 3,7 10% 
Income 
assistance 
programs (2) 10,5 30% 5,9 17% 6,1 15% 3,0 7% 7,7 20% 
Children related 
programs ( 3) 0,0 0% 7,4 21% 0,0 0% 5,1 11% 1,3 3% 
Tax credits and 
refunds (4) -0,3 -1% 0,8 2% 1,0 3% 1,4 3% 0,5 1% 
TOTAL 35,0 100% 34,7 100% 39,9 100% 45,0 100% 38,2 100% 
(1) Employment-insurance, QPP and drugs insurance 
(2) Social assistance, PWA, PWA supplement and housing allowance 
(3) CCTB, supplement for young child, family allowances, daycare and credit for childcare expenses 
(4) GST credit, QTS credit and property tax refund 
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 government is relatively low (amounting to 50 per cent of the global rate for a single-parent 
family), but the implicit rate on several income and family support programs starts to make 
itself felt (accounting for 41 per cent of the total rate on the single-parent family). At the 
other extreme, when income is approximately $50 000 (earned by the head of a two-parent 
family), income tax rates are higher (accounting for 70 per cent of the global rate confronting 
the two-parent family), while the clawback rate on government programs is nearly nil 
(accounting for 21 per cent of the overall rate for the two-parent family).  
As to the 5 per cent difference between the marginal rate on childless couples and 
two-parent couples, it is primarily explained by the presence of children. These make it 
possible for parents to access assistance programs whose payoffs decrease with rising family 
income, resulting in an implicit tax rate of 5 per cent. Aside from this difference, which 
explains the gap between the total rate, we also note that the composition of the mean rates is 
not exactly the same. Since the income of both members of childless couples is below that of 
the parents of two-parent families (cf. Figure 5), the implicit rate on income assistance 
programs is greater for the former, while the rates associated with income taxation are greater 
for the latter. 
4.2.4 The variability of EMTRs 
The variability of EMTRs can be analysed from several perspectives. First, we 
observe this variability of rates within our household groupings (by family status). Is there 
uniformity in marginal taxation, or do we find some types of inequality between households 
in the same group? Subsequently, we also analyse the degree of variability of EMTRs across 
the four groups. With all income categories considered, is there a form of inequality between 
these groups? Finally, we address the disparity of implicit rates within various groupings of 
programs and fiscal measures (for example: all income support measures, all programs 
targeted at children, etc.), as well as the interactions between these groupings.  
To analyse the variability of the EMTRs we use a generalized entropy index (cf., 
Fournier [2005] for more information on the indices used). An entropy index is a measure of 
dispersion or distance with respect to a centre (or mean). It captures the degree of disorder or 
inequality that reigns in a system. Thus, the entropy index will be zero if the EMTR is the 
same for everyone and high if differences between the rates and their means are large. 
Furthermore, a decomposition of the generalized entropy index allows inter-group inequality 
to be distinguished from intra-group inequality.23 
Table 4 presents the principal entropy measures we estimated. The first column shows 
the entropy estimate for each household type. The second column provides the normalized 
mean, which is the ratio of the mean of the marginal rate within the group to the mean rate for 
the entire population. The third column is the share of each group in the total population. The 
fourth and fifth columns summarize the decomposition of total inequality by indicating, in 
absolute and relative terms, the contribution of each group (as well as between-group 
                                                 
23 Estimates of the entropy measures and other computations were generated with the software DAD (for 
Distributive analysis/Analyse distributive). DAD was designed to facilitate the analysis and comparisons of 
social welfare, inequality, poverty, and equity across various population distributions. For more information 
regarding DAD, as well as equity and poverty measures, consult Duclos and Araar (2006). 
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 inequality) to total inequality. We first observe the value assumed by the entropy index for 
each of the four groups. This index is highest for the group of single-parent families (0.805). 
Thus, it is within this group that the greatest variation in EMTRs is found. Recall that single-
parent families are distributed between two main peaks. Many of them are in a situation of 
zero marginal taxation, while we also find a significant concentration around 60 per cent. The 
considerable distance between these two points of concentration explains the high entropy 
index. Single individuals occupy second place (0.578) in terms of an unequal distribution of 
rates. We can also explain this result by their distribution between effective marginal tax rates 
of zero and of 40 and 100 per cent. Finally, childless couples (0.195) and two-parent children 
(0.157) are in third and fourth place, respectively, in terms of the dispersion of tax rates. 
Density graphs for these two groups support this result (cf. Figure 9).  
Table 4: Entropy measures and decomposition of the inequality of the EMTRs 
 
Groups Estimate of entropy 
Normalised
mean
Proportion Absolute 
contribution
Relative 
contribution
Single 0,578 0,954 0,488 0,269 68,0%
Single parent 0,805 1,021 0,040 0,033 8,2%
Childless couple 0,195 1,007 0,285 0,056 14,1%
Two-parent 0,157 1,097 0,188 0,032 8,2%
Between-group inequality - - - 0,006 1,4%
Total inequality 0,395 100,0%  
The wide variability of the rates and the distribution of the households between very 
distant peaks of taxation for single individuals and single-parent families can be explained by 
the high proportion of low-income households we find in these two groups, compared to 
households with two adults. For each of those two groups we also computed the entropy 
index for family income. We observe that the groups with the greatest income disparity are 
also those in which we find the greatest disparities in the EMTRs.  
The inequality index for the whole population is 0.395. This index is the sum of two 
components: within-group and across-group inequality. Beginning with the first component, 
we first determine the relative contribution of each group in the population to the total 
inequality index. Single individuals have an index rate dispersal that is relatively high 
compared to the others. Since they also include 49 per cent of households, they contribute 
most to the variation in the rates. Single-parent families—the group within which disparities 
are greatest—contribute very little to the total inequality index owing to the small percentage 
of the population they represent (4 per cent). The second component is the share of the 
inequality attributable to the variation in the rates between groups. We observe that this 
component only contributes 1.4 per cent of total inequality. The fact that the normalized 
means are very near to one (1) also attests to the absence of inter-group inequality. In 
comparison, income disparity across groups contributes 26.2 per cent to the total income 
inequality within the population. Thus, while the distribution of mean incomes between 
groups presents a certain degree of inequality, it appears that, on average, the EMTRs vary 
very little across groups.  
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 Finally, we note that, while two-parent families face expected marginal rates that are 
relatively high compared to the other groups, it appears that there is little variation in the 
marginal rates confronting these families. Conversely, it is within this group that the variance 
in the marginal rate is greatest in the case of low incomes. This is what we see in Figure 11, 
which illustrates the standard deviation of the conditional marginal rates for a given income 
and family status.  
Figure 11 : Standard deviation of the marginal rates, conditional on a given income, by family 
status 
 
 
Figure 11 also shows the variability of EMTRs for low-income single-parent families. 
Compared to childless households, the fiscal situation of families is more variable in the 
lower income brackets in terms of marginal taxation for a given income. Overall, the reduced 
disparity amongst two-parent families is primarily attributable to the fact that they are richer 
than single-parent families. Finally, Figure 11 presents the relative invariability of EMTRs 
for medium- and high-income households. 
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It is instructive to analyse the variance of rates within various groupings of programs 
and fiscal measures. We created six groups:   
1) programs pertaining to children (including the CCTB, the federal government’s young 
child supplement, as well as family allowances from the provincial government); 
2) income support programs (including social assistance, the PWA24 program, and 
housing allowance, all of which are administered by the provincial government); 
                                                 
24 Including the supplement to the PWA program for childcare expenses. 
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 3) tax credits and rebates (the QST rebate and the provincial government’s 
reimbursement for property taxes as well as the GST rebate from the federal 
government belong to this category); 
4) premiums (including contributions to the EI and the QPP regimes); 
5) federal income tax; 
6) provincial income tax. 
In Table 5 we present the variance measured for each of these groups, as well as the 
covariance between them. 
It is the implicit tax rate associated with income support programs that varies most 
between households and thus contributes the most to global variability in the EMTRs. This 
result is not in the least surprising, since this implicit rate can be nil for some households and 
extremely high for others. Next, we observe that rates of income taxation by the two levels of 
government vary more than those of programs pertaining to children. Conversely, when we 
measure the variance of the rate for families only, we see that the variance of the implicit 
rates on programs for children is greater than that of income taxation. As to rates associated 
with premiums, they vary very little, being relatively low for working individuals (2.2 per 
cent for EI and 4.7 per cent for the QPP), and nil for those who are either not working or who 
have reached the ceiling on contributions. 
Table 5: Variance and covariance for groups of transfer programs and fiscal measures 
Programmes 
relative to 
children  
Programmes 
of income 
support  
Tax credits 
and refunds Contributions Federal tax Provincial tax EMTR 
Programmes 
relative to 
children 47.36 -5.73 5.89 3.03 2.88 -2.58 53.65
Programmes 
of income 
support  835.03 4.92 -6.03 -71.43 -97.05 672.05
Tax credits 
and refunds 87.86 5.48 10.60 23.37 142.95
Contributions 11.04 -1.14 -0.12 14.14
Federal tax 68.04 52.26 60.91
Provincial tax 99.04 72.76
EMTR 1050.62
 
As to the covariance, it is strongly negative between taxes and income support 
programs, indicating that households confronting high recovery rates for transfer programs 
benefit from low income tax rates. Moreover, there is a strongly positive correlation between 
provincial and federal income taxation, which is not surprising in light of the similarity 
between the taxation modes of the two governments. There is a negative, but relatively weak, 
correlation between programs for children and income support programs. This relationship 
can be explained by recalling that the premium clawback zones for these two groups of 
programs do not coincide perfectly. In the group of income support programs, most of the 
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 rate is attributable to social assistance. The highest level of implicit taxation associated with 
this program kicks in below the $15 000 income bracket (approximately, according to family 
type). As to child-related programs, the recuperation rate is triggered at incomes above $15 
000. Consequently, it is reasonable that we find a weak negative correlation between two 
groups of programs that are effective for different income levels in the fiscal profile of 
households.  
Finally, we note that the interactions between programs, i.e., the covariance between 
various groups of fiscal measures and transfers, contribute to reducing the global variability 
of the EMTR. In other words, the variance of the EMTR is less than the sum of the variances 
of its individual components. It is primarily the strong negative covariance between support 
programs and income taxation that contributes to this result. 
5. Conclusion 
Using a simulation model that reproduces Quebec’s taxation and transfer system 
almost in its entirety, this article completely characterizes the distribution of EMTRs in 
Quebec in 2002. In addition to presenting a detailed sketch of three representative tax 
profiles, we have generated a descriptive analysis of EMTRs for all households from various 
estimations, paying particular attention to the determinants of the means and the variability of 
these EMTRs as well as the situation of the families. 
We were able to observe that the households for which we find the highest EMTRs 
are primarily single, childless individuals, many of which face an EMTR in excess of 100 per 
cent. Though the simulations we ran revealed that this situation is less common among 
single-parent families, we were able to establish that over one-quarter of them confront an 
EMTR that can reach, or even exceed, 80 per cent. Mostly recipients of social assistance, 
these families must overcome a substantial hurdle to break free of the poverty trap, which 
income supplement programs, such as PWA, are not able to bridge. The situation of two-
parent families, whose mean income is higher, is quite different. The majority of them face an 
EMTR that approaches 50 per cent that is largely attributable to income taxes and programs 
for children that are phased out with rising income. Throughout the analysis, we have 
observed how government policies that are targeted to poorer families impose EMTRs on 
those with higher incomes that exceed those facing childless households and add a 
considerable burden at the margin. We have also observed that it is the implicit tax rate 
associated with income support programs that varies most between households and that thus 
contributes the most to global variability in the EMTR. Similarly, even if the distribution of 
average incomes across groups presents some inequality, average EMTRs differ little 
between groups; it is their variability within groups that largely explains the global variability 
of EMTRs in the population. 
The characterization of EMTRs we have been able to present also provides a useful 
tool for a broader contemplation of the possibilities of tax reform. Among other things, the 
particular attention paid to the current situation of families in the analysis of the results makes 
possible a critical reflection on the solution paths for reducing the effective taxation on 
families that have been put forward in the literature. Thus, abandoning the current selective 
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 family income security plan in favour of a universal recognition of the cost or raising children 
is a first possibility for reducing effective rates. This solution is proposed in Poschmann and 
Mintz (1999), Lefebvre (1999), and Poschmann and Richards (2000). Universalization could 
take the form, for example, of the introduction (among other things) of a non-refundable tax 
credit for dependent children at the federal level, which would be similar to the one in 
Quebec, and which would have the benefit of raising the threshold above which a family 
begins to pay taxes. This return to universality could, however, result in higher tax rates on 
individuals with medium or high incomes [Kesselman (1999)]. Thus, while the non-
refundable tax credit is an interesting option in and of itself, how it is financed requires 
careful attention.  
Finally, recourse to programs that top-up labour income, making the labour market 
more attractive to non-participants, is a solution that already existed on a small scale in 2002 
(with the PWA program) and that could be expanded (Lefebvre, 1999). During the analysis of 
the tax profiles of single- and two-parent families we saw that the PWA program did not fully 
achieve its purpose in 2002, as the barrier formed by an effective taxation rate of 100 per cent 
was only partially eliminated. Thus, we observe that 5 per cent of single-parent families face 
a marginal rate of 100 per cent. In 2005, the Government of Quebec launched a working 
bonus program (“prime au travail”), leading to the elimination of the PWA in favour of an 
income supplementation program accessible to all low-income households. This bonus takes 
the form of a refundable tax credit. It is paid out to household with a minimum monthly 
income. This measure could improve incentives to households facing a high marginal rate 
and that were not eligible to the PWA (i.e., single individuals and childless couples), or that 
did not participate in that program. Conversely, it remains to be established how the negative 
impact of increasing labour income on benefits will affect these households’ EMTR in the 
phasing-out of this working bonus. 
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ment. 
Appendix A. Description of the fiscal measures and social transfer programs of the provincial 
and federal governments 
This appendix describes the principal governmental measures having an impact on 
EMTRs and that were included in our microsimulation model.25 The measures are 
categorized into two broad groupings: those of the Government of Quebec and those of the 
federal govern
1. Measures of the Government of Quebec 
1.1 Taxation 
Taxation in Quebec comprises a tax table, tax credits, and payroll deductions. Not all 
tax credits and deductions were retained;only those having an impact on the fiscal situation of 
Quebec families will be described. 
- Tax table 
The tax table allows the amount of income payable to the Government of Quebec to 
be determined on the basis of the taxpayer’s taxable income. It is divided into three brackets 
that vary with the amount of taxable income (Table I). 
Table 1: Tax Table 
Taxable income Marginal rate
From $0 to $26 700 16 %
From $26 701 to $53 405 20 %
$53 406 and over 24 %
- Credit for an individual living alone 
A non-refundable tax credit is given to an individual living alone (or exclusively with 
one or several dependant children). The credit may be as much as $224, or 20.75 per cent of a 
maximum amount of $1080. This maximum amount is reduced by 15 per cent of net 
household income in excess of $26 700. Thus, the credit becomes nil when income reaches 
$33 900 (on the assumption that the age credit and pension income credit are not claimed). 
Table 2: Credit of a an Individual Living Alone 
Maximum 
amount 
Conversion 
rate 
Fiscal value Clawback 
threshold 
Income at which 
the credit is nil 
Clawback 
rate 
$1080 20.75 % $224 $26 700 $33 900 15 % 
- Spousal credit 
A non-refundable tax credit is given to taxpayers who cared for their spouses for some 
period during the tax year. This credit may reach $1258, or 20.75 per cent of a maximum 
amount of $6060. Notice that the maximum amount of the spouse’s income for the tax year 
must be subtracted, reducing the fiscal value of the tax credit. 
- Credit for dependant children 
A non-refundable tax credit is granted to taxpayers with dependant children. The base 
amount is $2670 for one child and $2465 for each additional child. In a single-parent family, 
                                                 
25 Data in this document on tax measures and transfer programs reflect the 2002 tax year unless otherwise 
indicated. 
 there is an additional $1335 for the first child registered. It should be noted that an amount for 
postsecondary studies ($1694 per term completed, up to two terms per dependant child) can 
be added to the calculation of the amount for dependant children—though the child’s income 
must be deducted from the base amount. Retaining the conversion rate of 20.75 per cent, 
Table 3 presents the maximum fiscal value the credit can reach in some family situations. 
Table 3: Maximum Value of the Non-Refundable Tax Credit for Dependant Children1 
Two-parent family Single-parent family 
1 child 2 children 3 children 1 child 2 children 3 children 
$554 $1066 $1577 $831 $1343 $1854 
1. The credit is computed on the assumption that that the child’s income and the amount for 
postsecondary studies is nil. 
- Income tax reductions affecting families 
Taxpayers with dependant children are eligible for a tax cut with respect to the family. 
The purpose of this tax measure is to raise the income threshold above which the family 
begins to pay income tax to the Government of Quebec. The reduction of the tax burden 
imposed on the family contributes to better integrating the provincial income tax regime with 
transfers. The maximum this tax cut can reach is $1500 for a couple with children and $1195 
for a single-parent family. These amounts are reduced by three per cent of net family income 
in excess of $26 700. 
Table 4: Tax Reduction with Respect to Families 
 Maximum 
amount 
Clawback 
threshold 
Clawback rate Maximum family 
income 
Couple with children $1500 $26 700 3 % $76 700 
Single-parent family $1195 $26 700 3 % $66 533 
- Refundable tax credit for childcare expenditures 
Childcare services that are paid by the taxpayer qualify for a refundable income tax 
credit. It is important to note that the parental contribution of $5 per day per child established 
by the Government of Quebec in its new family policy is not eligible for the tax credit. 
The tax credit is a function of family income, and the allotted compensation ranges 
between 26 and 75 per cent of eligible daycare fees. The limit of daycare expenditures 
admissible is determined by the child’s age, and can be $4000 or $7000.  
Moreover, families receiving last resort assistance are eligible for free educational 
childcare services (up to 100 days per year). 
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 Table 5: Schedule for the Refundable Tax Credit for Childcare Expenses 
Family income ($) Rate of Family income ($) Rate of Family income ($) Rate of 
greater 
than 
less than or 
equal to 
tax credit (%) greater 
than 
less than or 
equal to 
tax credit (%) greater 
than 
less than or 
equal to 
tax credit (%)
0 27 730 75 44 160 45 185 58 61 620 62 645 41 
27 730 28 755 74 45 185 46 215 57 62 645 63 675 40 
28 755 29 785 73 46 215 47 240 56 63 675 64 700 39 
29 785 30 810 72 47 240 48 270 55 64 700 65 725 38 
30 810 31 835 71 48 270 49 295 54 65 725 66 755 37 
31 835 32 865 70 49 295 50 320 53 66 755 67 780 36 
32 865 33 890 69 50 320 51 350 52 67 780 68 810 35 
33 890 34 920 68 51 350 52 375 51 68 810 69 835 34 
34 920 35 945 67 52 375 53 405 50 69 835 70 860 33 
35 945 36 970 66 53 405 54 430 49 70 860 71 890 32 
36 970 38 000 65 54 430 55 455 48 71 890 72 915 31 
38 000 39 025 64 55 455 56 485 47 72 915 73 945 30 
39 025 40 055 63 56 485 57 510 46 73 945 74 970 29 
40 055 41 080 62 57 510 58 540 45 74 970 75 995 28 
41 080 42 105 61 58 540 59 565 44 75 995 77 025 27 
42 105 43 135 60 59 565 60 590 43 77 025 and more 26 
43 135 44 160 59 60 590 61 620 42   
- Refundable income tax credit for Quebec’s provincial sales tax (QST) 
Family income dictates whether taxpayers and their spouses qualify for a refundable 
income tax credit for the PST, a fiscal measure targeted at low-income households. The 
maximum amount is $158 per adult. A person living alone is allotted an additional $106. The 
amount of the QST credit is reduced by 3 per cent of family income exceeding $26 000. 
Table 6: Refundable QST Credit 
 Ceiling Clawback 
threshold 
Maximum 
family income 
Clawback 
rate 
Individual not living alone $158 $26 700 $31 966 3 % 
Individual living alone $264 $26 700 $35 500 3 % 
Couple $316 $26 700 $37 233 3 % 
- Property tax rebate 
The property tax rebate is targeted at homeowners, tenants, and sub-tenants and is 
designed to partially offset property taxes (including school and municipal taxes). The 
maximum amount that can be obtained corresponds to 40 per cent of property taxes in excess 
of $880 in the case of a taxpayer with spouse and $440 in the case of a taxpayer living alone. 
This rebate is reduced by 3 per cent of income in excess of $26 700. Table 7 presents the 
maximum family income eligible for a rebate by family status and the level of property taxes. 
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 Table 7: Maximum Family Income by the Situation of the Family and the Level of Property 
Taxes 
Couple Individual living alone 
Property taxes ($) Family income Property taxes ($) Family income 
from to maximum ($) from to maximum ($) 
880 980 28 033 440 540 28 033 
981 1080 29 367 551 640 29 367 
1081 1180 30 700 641 740 30 700 
1181 1280 32 033 741 840 32 033 
1281 1380 33 367 841 940 33 367 
1381 1480 34 700 941 1040 34 700 
1481 1580 36 033 1041 1140 36 033 
1581 1680 37 367 1141 1240 37 367 
1681 1780 38 700 1241 1340 38 700 
1781 1880 40 033 1341 1440 40 033 
1881 1980 41 367 1441 1540 41 367 
1981 2080 42 700 1541 1640 42 700 
2081 2180 44 033 1641 1740 44 033 
2181 and more 44 300 1741 and more 44 300 
- Québec Pension Plan contributions 
The QPP is a public, mandatory insurance plan. Its goal is to provide workers with 
basic financial security at retirement or in the event of death or disability. Premiums paid by 
employees and employers finance the plan. 
The employee benefits from a general exemption of $3500 and pays no premiums on 
income exceeding the threshold of $39 100. The premium, applied to the portion of the wage 
between the general exemption and the maximum, is 4.7 per cent for the employee (9.4 per 
cent in total, with the employer matching the employee’s contribution). 
- Contribution to the Quebec Drug Insurance Plan 
The Quebec Drug Insurance Plan was set up to ensure a minimum of protection to the 
entire population. Since its creation in January 1997, every individual must be ensured, either 
by a group drug insurance plan or by the public plan, which is managed by the Régie de 
l’assurance maladie du Québec. Individuals insured by the public plan must pay a premium 
that may reach $460 per adult per year. This amount is fixed as a function of net family 
income. 
- Tax treatment of spousal support 
New measures regarding the tax exemption of spousal support payments entered into 
effect on May 1, 1997 (they apply to support payments made under a written agreement or a 
court ruling dated after April 30, 1997). In general, payments are no longer deductible by the 
person making them, and they are no longer included in the income of the recipient. 
Nonetheless, payments received under an agreement or a ruling predating May 1, 1997, must 
be declared, and the person making them can deduct them from income. 
1.2 Transfer programs 
Income support policies of the Government of Quebec were once known as income 
security or social assistance benefits. Adopted in 1998, the Act respecting Income Support, 
employment assistance, and social solidarity inaugurated a new income support regime that 
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 incorporated several programs, two of which are presented below: last resort assistance and 
Parental Wage Assistance (PWA). 
We next describe the family allowance, which is part of the family policy of the 
Government of Quebec, and the shelter allowance program. 
- Last resort assistance 
This program strives to provide financial assistance of last resort to individuals who 
are capable of working to motivate them to undertake or pursue efforts to integrate, or 
reintegrate, into the job market, and to support them during those steps. It is also designed to 
provide last resort assistance to those suffering from certain limitations in their ability to 
work. 
To qualify for financial assistance, a household must demonstrate that its resources 
and revenues are below the level necessary, as determined by regulation, to provide for its 
basic needs (housing, food, etc.). The level of support given includes a base amount that 
varies with the family composition. Furthermore, supplementary adjustments for 
employability constraints and dependant children are also provided.  
Table 8: Employment Assistance Program1 (in dollars per year) 
 Base benefit Permitted labour income Clawback rate Maximum income
Single-parent family $6180 Up to $2400 100 % $8580 
Couple $9564 Up to $3600 100 % $13 164 
1. Amounts in effect on January 1, 2002. 
2. Depending on the individual’s situation (the income allowed without penalty for a single, able-
bodied person $1200 per year). 
- PWA program 
The PWA program offers financial assistance to low-income workers with dependant 
children to provide them with an incentive to enter, or remain in, the labour market. It inflates 
the gap between income from labour and from social assistance. The PWA allows families to 
obtain monthly assistance, $3 per day for daycare costs (for each child enrolled in a $5 per 
day daycare service, except in the case of two-parent families in which one of the parents is 
not working), and payments based on forecasts of the refundable income tax credit for 
childcare services. For families receiving Employment Assistance and having income that is 
admissible to the PWA program, the PWA benefit is added to Employment Assistance 
payments. 
To be eligible for the PWA program, the total of a two-parent family’s gross income 
must be less than $21 820. In the case of a single-parent family, the upper income threshold 
was established at $15 530. The maximum PWA benefit increases by 35 per cent of labour 
income exceeding $1200 (a minimum labour income of $100 per month is required to be 
eligible for the program). Furthermore, it is clawed back at the rate of 43 per cent of total 
excess income and at an additional rate of 23 per cent for replacement income (e.g., CSST 
benefits). The PWA benefit is computed on the basis of the income the family expects to 
earn. Thus, at the end of the year it is necessary to compute the balance so as to pay out the 
benefits due or to recover excess amounts disbursed. 
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 - Family allowance 
A part of the Government of Quebec’s family policy, the family allowance seeks to 
subsidize the basic needs of children and low-income families while accounting for the 
federal government’s Canada Child Tax Benefit. The level of the family allowance varies 
with the family status (single-parent or two-parent), the number of dependant children under 
18 years old, and family income. The maximum benefit is $975 per child, and it is clawed 
back as a function of net household income during the previous tax year.  
Table 9 presents the principal elements of the calculation of the allowance, depending 
on whether family income falls below or exceeds $50 000. 
Table 9: Quebec Family Allowance1 
Family income of $50 000 or less Family over $50 000 
Initial amount  Initial amount  
First child $625 First child $80 
Second child $625 Second child $80 
Third child and more $625 Third child and more $975 
Supplement for single-parent families  
$1300 
  
Clawback threshold  Clawback threshold  
- Single-parent family  - 5 % clawback rate $50 000 
35 % clawback rate $15 332   
25 % clawback rate $21 214   
- Two-parent family     
25 % clawback rate $21 825   
Minimum guaranteed amount     
First child $80   
Second child $80   
Third child and more $975   
1. For the period from August 2001 to July 2002. 
- Shelter allowance 
The shelter allowance program, which is targeted at both owners and tenants, provides 
financial assistance to low-income families who devote too much of their budget to housing 
(i.e. over 30 per cent of their income). The level of the allocation takes into consideration the 
family type and the number of occupants, income, and the monthly rent. The financial 
assistance can reach as much as $80 per month. 
2. Measures of the federal government 
2.1 Taxation 
This section contains descriptions of the federal government’s tax measures, i.e. 
deductions (only one will be presented, covering childcare expenditures), its tax table, its 
income tax credits, and its payroll deductions. Not all tax credits and deductions were 
retained, but only those having an impact on the fiscal situation of Quebec families will be 
described. 
- Deduction for childcare expenses 
When computing the net income of a household, provision is made for a deduction for 
childcare expenses. This deduction may rise as high as $7000 per dependant child. 
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 - Tax table 
The tax table allows the amount of income to be paid to the federal government to be 
determined on the basis of the taxpayer’s taxable income. It is divided into four brackets that 
vary with the amount of taxable income (Table 10). 
It should be noted that residents of Quebec benefit from a refundable tax abatement. 
The federal government provides this abatement in lieu of participating in shared-cost 
programs in the framework of federal-provincial agreements. This abatement, corresponding 
to 16.5 per cent of the base federal income tax, reduces federal income taxes levied on 
residents of Quebec (and may even yield a reimbursement). 
Table 10: Tax Table 
Taxable income Marginal rate 
From $0 to $31 677 16 % 
From $31 678 to $63 354 22 % 
From $63 355 to $103 000 26 % 
$103 001 and over 29 % 
- Spousal credit 
A non-refundable tax credit is given to taxpayers who cared for their spouses for some 
period during the tax year. This credit may reach $1037, or 16 per cent of a maximum 
amount of $6482. Notice that the maximum amount of the spouse’s income for the tax year 
must be subtracted, reducing the fiscal value of the tax credit. If the spouse’s income is $7131 
or more, no spousal credit will be paid out. 
- Credit for an eligible dependant 
An individual applying for this non-refundable income tax credit must be single, 
divorced, separated, or widowed. Thus, a single-parent family can benefit from this credit, 
which can reach $1037, or 16 per cent of a maximum of $6482. As in the case of the spousal 
credit, the taxpayer must subtract the income of the dependant from the maximum amount. 
- Refundable tax credit for the goods and services tax (GST) 
The GST tax credit, like the PST credit, is designed to help low-income families by 
partially or fully compensating for the GST they must pay. The maximum of the refundable 
tax credit for the GST is $213 per adult and $112 for each dependant child. In addition, a 
single-parent family receives a supplement of $112 (single-parent families receive the full 
amount of the supplement, while single, childless individuals receive the lesser of $112 or 2 
per cent of net income in excess of $6911). The income tax credit is clawed back at a rate of 
5 per cent of the difference between the household’s net income and $27 749 and is based on 
income in the previous fiscal year. 
39 
 Table 11: Refundable GST Credit 
 Ceiling Clawback 
threshold 
Maximum 
family income 
Clawback 
rate 
Single-parent family     
- one child $437 $27 749 $36 489 5 % 
- two children $549 $27 749 $38 729 5 % 
- three children $661 $27 749 $40 969 5 % 
Two-parent family     
- one child $538 $27 749 $38 509 5 % 
- two children $650 $27 749 $40 749 5 % 
- three children $762 $27 749 $42 989 5 % 
- Employment Insurance premiums 
EI provides temporary financial assistance to an unemployed person during a period 
of job search or training, pregnancy, while caring for a newborn or an adopted infant, or 
during illness. This plan is financed by premiums paid by employees and employers. 
The rate of EI premiums paid by employees was 2.20 per cent during the fiscal year 
2002. This rate applies to the portion of the annual wage that is equal to, or less than, 
insurable earnings of $39 000 (thus, the maximum premium was $858 in 2002). Furthermore, 
for an employee whose total insurable earnings are $2000 or less, the premium is fully 
refundable. 
- Tax treatment of spousal support 
The tax treatment of spousal support by the federal government is essentially the same 
as that of the provincial government (cf. Section 1.1, Tax treatment of spousal support). 
2.2 Transfer programs 
- Canada Child Tax Benefit (CCTB) 
The CCTB is paid to eligible families to help them meet the needs of their children. It 
consists of two elements: the CCTB base benefit and the CCTB supplement. The base benefit 
is $1117 per child, and provision is made for a supplement for children under seven years of 
age as well as for families with three children or more. It should be noted that the benefit is a 
function of net family income during the previous year. It is clawed back at a rate of 2.5 or 5 
per cent (2.5 for families with one child and 5 for families with two or more children) from 
the portion of the family’s net income exceeding the threshold of $32 000. 
The CCTB supplement, which varies with the number of children, is targeted at low 
income families. The maximum amount is clawed back at a rate of 12.2, 22.5, or 32.1 per 
cent (depending on the number of children), as a function of the household net income over 
$21 744). 
40 
 Table 12: Canada Child Tax Benefit ((July 2002, by income during the year 2001) 
 Ceiling Clawback 
threshold 
Income at which 
the benefit is nil 
Clawback 
rate 
CCTB     
- one child $1117 $32 000 $76 680 2.5 % 
- two children $2234 $32 000 $76 680 5.0 % 
- three children $3429 $32 000 $100 580 5.0 % 
CCTB supplement     
- one child $1255 $21 744 $32 031 12.2 % 
- two children $2310 $21 744 $32 011 22.5 % 
- three children $3290 $21 744 $31 993 32.1 % 
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Appendix B. Assumptions formulated for realizing the three representative tax profiles 
 Single person Single-parent family Two-parent family 
Welfare allowance No work handicap Temporary handicap No work handicap 
Age of child -- 3 years 3 years 
Age of child 2 -- 5 years 5 years 
Income sharing 100% of parent 1 100% of parent 1 100% of parent 1 
Daycare expenses -- 5$ None (only one 
parent work) 
Employment expenses 0$ 0$ 0$ 
PWA -- Yes Yes 
Drug insurance Public Public Public 
Drug expenses 0$ 0$ 0$ 
Alimony 0$ 0$ 0$ 
Rent Fixed to 428$ Fixed to 554$ Fixed to 554$ 
 
